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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-1032 
____________ 
 
MIGUEL PEREZ 
 
v. 
 
CAMDEN MUNICIPAL COURT;  
CITY OF CAMDEN 
 
 
   City of Camden, 
                        Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-14-cv-07473) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 12, 2017 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, RENDELL and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 25, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Appellee Miguel Perez filed a complaint against Appellants Camden Municipal 
Court and the City of Camden (collectively “Camden”) alleging violations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),1 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,2 and the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).3 Camden filed a motion for summary 
judgment; Perez filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The District Court 
granted Perez partial summary judgment on liability under the ADA, the Rehabilitation 
Act, and the NJLAD. It granted Camden summary judgment on the injunctive relief 
Perez requested, but denied Camden summary judgment as to damages. It did not 
consider judicial immunity, which Camden raised, to be applicable because no judicial 
officer was named as a defendant. 
Camden appeals, arguing that the District Court erred with regard to both judicial 
immunity and the grant of partial summary judgment to Perez. For the reasons that 
follow, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
I. 
 Perez is profoundly deaf, and he communicates through American Sign Language 
(“ASL”). Perez was convicted of driving under the influence and sentenced to complete a 
drivers’ education course. He did not complete the course and was summoned to Camden 
                                              
1 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
2 29 U.S.C. § 794.  
3 N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-1 et seq. 
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Municipal Court. Several weeks in advance of his court date, he advised the Municipal 
Court that he required an ASL interpreter. Over the course of the next year, Perez 
appeared at the Municipal Court eight times in connection with his DUI sentence. Only 
once did the court provide an ASL interpreter. Perez filed a complaint, asserting that 
Camden’s failure to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability violated his 
rights under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NJLAD.  
II. 
Before reaching the merits, we consider whether we have jurisdiction over this 
appeal. We have jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 
the United States.4 A decision is final when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”5 An order that “resolv[es] liability 
without addressing a plaintiff’s requests for relief is not final.”6 Here, as both parties 
recognize, the decision did not resolve all claims and did not end the litigation, and 
therefore is not a final decision.  
Camden argues that this Court nevertheless has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and the collateral order doctrine established in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp.7 To be immediately appealable as a collateral order, a district court decision must: 
                                              
4 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
5 Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 419 (2008) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 
U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). 
6 Id. at 419.  
7 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
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(1) be conclusive as to the disputed question; (2) “resolve important questions completely 
separate from the merits”; and (3) “render such important questions effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.”8 The third element 
requires a “judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous 
application of a final judgment requirement.”9 The denial of a “substantial claim of 
absolute immunity” can be appealed before final judgement.10 Judicial immunity, which 
Camden raised here, protects judicial officers from personal liability for judicial acts, so 
long as they are not taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.11  
The District Court’s statement that judicial immunity only bars suit against a 
judicial officer is not an appealable collateral order. Just as municipalities cannot assert 
qualified immunity defenses as a means of gaining review of adverse denials of summary 
judgment, neither can Camden assert a judicial immunity defense to appeal this District 
Court decision under the collateral order doctrine.12 Without a judicial officer making the 
claim, there is no “substantial claim of absolute immunity.”13 
Judicial immunity protects the judicial officer so that “in exercising the authority 
vested in him, [he] shall be free to act upon his own convictions without apprehension of 
                                              
8 Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994). 
9 Id. at 878-79. 
10 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985). 
11 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 60 (1978). 
12 See Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1105 (3d Cir. 1990). 
13 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525. 
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personal consequences to himself.”14 This important interest in shielding individual 
officials from litigation satisfies the third prong of the Cohen test and allows judicial 
officers to appeal denials of judicial immunity.15 Here, no judicial officer has been denied 
immunity. The District Court’s decision not to apply judicial immunity to municipal 
entities does not implicate sufficiently important interests to satisfy the third prong of 
Cohen. For these reasons, the District Court’s statement that judicial immunity only bars 
suit against a judicial officer is not reviewable under the collateral order doctrine.  
III. 
Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal. 
                                              
14 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872). 
15 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 (“the denial of a substantial claim of absolute 
immunity is an order appealable before final judgment”); Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 
121-22 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a denial of a motion to dismiss on the issue of judicial 
immunity is appealable under the collateral order doctrine). 
